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Abstract
This Article provides a foundational structural analysis underlying
the federal procedural system and explores the implications of that
normative framework for the proper shaping of the federal system’s
pleading and discovery rules. By analyzing and synthesizing the
different elements of this underlying “litigation matrix,” the Article
concludes that the Supreme Court’s “plausibility” test for pleading
under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents an
appropriate balance of the competing deep structural elements by
imposing on a defendant the risks of unnecessarily burdensome pretrial
discovery processes only when the complaint includes enough facts to
suggest the viability of plaintiff’s allegations of legal wrongdoing. The
Article argues, however, that current methods for controlling discovery
abuse are inadequate, and therefore significant alterations in the
methods for controlling discovery are necessary in order to successfully
implement the litigation matrix. Specifically, the costs of discovery
need to be recognized, in the first instance, as appropriately attributable
to the party requesting information, rather than the party responding to
information requests.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are rapidly approaching their
seventy-fifth birthday, which will come in the year 2013. Seventy-five
years is a long time, and while the Rules have of course been amended
significantly at various points over the years, their basic structure
remains largely the same as in their original formulation. When first
promulgated in 1938, the Rules had an immediate and dramatic impact
on civil adjudication by replacing long-accepted procedural practices
with very different methods of resolving disputes. There can be little
question that the new system, spearheaded by the genius of Advisory
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Committee Reporter Charles Clark,1 radically altered not only the actual
procedures themselves, but also the underlying set of values that had
previously rationalized our procedural system. The problem, right from
the start, was that there was precious little articulation of what the new
value system was and why it was deemed preferable to the value
structure underlying the old system.
To be sure, at the most basic level the stark differences between the
two systems must have been obvious to all involved. In place of the
draconian requirements of the demanding fact pleading standard, which
required a plaintiff to know all of the circumstances surrounding his
injury in detail at the time of the pleading, the new Federal Rules
demanded considerably less at the pleading stage. The information that
was unavailable at the pleading stage could now be gathered through a
complex system of court-enforced discovery.2 But exactly why this
dramatic change was made was never fully clarified by any of the key
actors. Thus, while it was clear that the change was premised in some
sense on the notion that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation,”3 the deep
structure of the underlying value system was never satisfactorily
articulated.
In part, this failure may have been due to the pressures imposed by
narrow political considerations. In his scholarly work defending the new
procedural system embodied in the Federal Rules, Judge Clark
mystifyingly characterized the changes as merely the natural evolution
of the preexisting process.4 Yet that statement could not have been
farther from the truth. One can reasonably surmise that Judge Clark’s
characterization of the Rules’ intended impact on existing procedural
practices was largely a strategic effort to allay fears about the seemingly
dramatic nature of the changes being adopted.
Judge Clark’s description, however, may also partially have been
the result of the traditional failure of scholars to consider procedural
issues from a “deep structural” perspective. By “deep structure,” I refer
to a synthesis of the fundamental social, moral, political, and economic
values that society seeks to foster in shaping its civil litigation process.5
As a general matter, procedural scholarship focuses on what can be
described as “second-level” analysis, which refers to issues surrounding
1. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976) (exploring Judge Clark’s behavior as the
draftsman of the Rules).
2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–02 (1947).
3. Id. at 507.
4. See Charles E. Clark, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 NEB. L. REV. 307,
308–09 (1942).
5. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 593–600 (2001).
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the shaping of specific procedural doctrines.6 Only rarely, however,
have procedural scholars sought to tackle procedural questions as
foundational as the intersection between procedure and democratic
theory. This characterization is even more applicable to procedural
scholarship at the time the Federal Rules were adopted, when legal
scholars focused almost exclusively on narrow, even technical, issues of
legal doctrine and analysis. Thus, although no one—including both
those who agreed and those who disagreed with the changes brought
about by the Federal Rules—could doubt the dramatic impact of Judge
Clark’s revisions on our nation’s sociopolitical and economic structure,
it appears that absolutely no efforts were made at the time to view those
changes through the lens of foundational political or socioeconomic
theory. This failure is truly unfortunate, since the choices made in
shaping the Rules will necessarily impact our socioeconomic and
political structure, whether we are fully aware of that impact or not.
The rapid approach of the Rules’ anniversary provides an
appropriate opportunity to begin such a deep structural analysis with the
benefit of almost seventy-five years of experience. This analytical
inquiry appears to be timely for at least three additional reasons, as well.
First, in two decisions over the last three years, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 the Supreme Court caused an
enormous stir—among judges, scholars, and practitioners—over the
proper pleading standard. Critics of these decisions (and there are
almost too many critics to count) have mounted a variety of attacks on
the Court’s recent statements concerning the level of factual detail
required in a complaint filed in federal court.9 These pleading decisions
have been criticized for improperly abandoning the notice pleading
standard embodied in Rule 8(a) and the Court’s famed decision of
Conley v. Gibson,10 for reintroducing the pre-Federal Rules “fact
pleading” standard, and for improperly preventing plaintiffs from
6. Id. at 567–68.
7. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff’s factual allegations must “be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true . . . ”) (citation omitted).
8. 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (holding that a complaint’s legal conclusions must be
supported by factual allegations).
9. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 265 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal’s interpretation
of Rule 8 is “unconstitutional” in cases where the Seventh Amendment should apply); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (arguing that the new
pleading standard is “an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8 that will frustrate the efforts of
plaintiffs with valid claims . . . ”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17 (2010)
(arguing that because of the Iqbal and Twombly decisions, the motion to dismiss is the “new
summary judgment motion”).
10. 355 U.S. 41, 45–48 (1957); see also discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
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having their “day in court” as a means of vindicating their substantive
rights.11 On the other hand, scholarly defenses of the Court’s decisions
in Twombly or Iqbal have been relatively few and far between.12 It is
probably not an overstatement to suggest that the combination of lower
court confusion and intense scholarly controversy caused by two
Supreme Court decisions concerning the Federal Rules over so short a
time period is unprecedented.
The second reason that reconsideration of the theoretical
foundations of our procedural system is timely is the elephant in the
room that appears to have driven the Supreme Court’s controversial
pleading decisions: the Court’s lingering concern over the serious
burdens caused by the elaborate discovery process that represented the
original Federal Rules’ most significant innovation. Designed to enable
litigants to gather the information necessary to facilitate accurate
decisionmaking and the effective vindication of substantive rights, 13 the
discovery process has a dark side that seems to have been largely
undervalued at the time of the Rules’ framing. At least in an important
category of litigation—those cases in which significant amounts of
discovery are likely to take place—the costs and burdens inherent in the
discovery process threaten to give rise both to serious inefficiencies in
the adjudicatory process and to a potentially pathological and coercive
skewing of the applicable substantive law being enforced.14 The Court
clearly reasoned in its recent pleading decisions that unless the pleading
standards effectively perform some meaningful gatekeeping function,
the harms caused by excessive and burdensome discovery could easily
overwhelm the adjudication in much of modern high stakes litigation.15
11. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.2.
12. For a scholarly defense of the Twombly decision, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility
Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849,
851 (2010) (stating that the benefits of Twombly “should be considered seriously in designing an
optimal pleading approach”).
13. See discussion infra Part I.
14. See discussion infra Part I.
15. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). The Court discussed
the discovery process as follows:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief
can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through
“careful case management,” given the common lament that the success of
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.
And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot be solved by
“careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid
instructions to juries;” the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the
level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous
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Yet even with the pleading standard performing this filtering function,
the fact remains that in the cases that are allowed to proceed beyond the
pleading stage, the burdens and costs of discovery are likely to continue
to be substantial. The problems of excessive discovery, then, remain a
significant concern.
The final reason that a reconsideration of the foundations of modern
civil procedure is now timely is that both Congress16 and the Rules
Advisory Committee17 are presently contemplating the possibility of
major changes in the Rules. It could be disastrous if either Congress or
the Committee were to alter the current adjudicatory structure without
first exploring and articulating a coherent perception of the foundational
political and socioeconomic underpinnings of the procedural system
they seek to fashion. The purpose of this Article is to begin that
important undertaking.
Part I of this Article articulates the basic value structure that
appropriately underlies our procedural system. In doing so, this Article
seeks to fashion the deep structure of modern procedure—which this
Article refers to as “the litigation matrix.”18 Part II considers how
modern pleading standards need to be shaped in order to implement that
matrix of underlying values most effectively. In so doing, this Article
seeks to explain why, despite some unfortunate and largely unnecessary
confusion caused by the Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal, the
“plausibility” approach the Court attempted to fashion in those
decisions actually represents a wise balance of all of the competing and
complementary underlying values.19 Part II concludes by explaining
why, despite the torrent of criticism to which it has been subjected, the
Twombly–Iqbal plausibility standard represents the fairest and most
efficient resolution of the conflicting interests.
In Part III, this Article turns to an issue inextricably intertwined with
the pleading controversy: the troublesome questions surrounding
discovery reform. Foundational precepts of economic, moral, and
political theory dictate a dramatic ex ante change in the structural
expense of discovery in cases with no “reasonably founded hope that the
[discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence” to support a § 1 claim.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
16. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
17. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & THE COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rule
sAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Report%20to%20the%20Chief%20Justice.pdf.
18. See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of
the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330–31 (2005) (explaining the “contours of the
litigation matrix”). See generally Redish, supra note 5, at 568–70 (discussing the goals of the
“litigation matrix”).
19. See infra Sections II.D–E.
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operation of the discovery process which, if implemented, would
undoubtedly reduce the costs and burdens of the process while
preserving the bulk of its beneficial functions. That change, simply put,
would be to recognize that the costs of discovery are, from the outset,
properly attributed to the requesting party rather than the responding
party. Indeed, classic notions of quantum meruit—long recognized as an
indisputable moral and legal dictate in the law of contracts—permit no
other conclusion.20 Were this alteration in the nature of the discovery
process to be implemented, an immediate economic externality—one
that currently plagues all discovery requests—would be removed. As a
result, the discovery system would be relieved of most forms of even
nonabusive “excessive” discovery requests—discovery that is simply
not justified on the basis of a rational cost–benefit analysis.21 It may
also be necessary to consider imposition of direct structural limits on the
nature and scope of discovery, though exactly how those limits should
be framed will not be free from controversy. Finally, in Part IV, this
Article considers alternative ways the current Federal Rules could be
amended in order to implement these insights.
Notably, in shaping and applying the litigation matrix to the
questions of pleading and discovery, this Article in no way intends to
imply that either the factors to be included in that matrix or the manner
in which they interact is free from debate or controversy. Nor does this
Article intend to imply that even if a consensus existed as to the abstract
normative elements to be included within the matrix, determining how
that matrix should apply to individual situations would always be free
from controversy. The goal of this Article, rather, is merely to shift the
focus of the ongoing debate about the nature and scope of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to an inquiry into the moral, economic, and
political factors that are properly deemed to provide the theoretical
foundations of modern procedure.
I. EXPLORING THE DEEP STRUCTURE OF MODERN PROCEDURE: SHAPING
THE LITIGATION MATRIX
There exists no officially recognized list of values which our
procedural system is appropriately deemed to foster or achieve.22
Approximately a decade ago, however, I suggested a consensus
grouping of broad normative goals that, when synthesized
appropriately, make up the normative deep structure of modern
procedural theory.23 “Some of these goals are affirmative, goals the
procedural system should accomplish. Others are negative, goals that
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.C.
Redish, supra note 5, at 593.
Id. at 593–600.
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attempt to limit the dangers to which the procedural system may give
rise.”24 At that time, the foundational litigation matrix included six
elements: “(1) decisionmaking accuracy; (2) adjudicatory efficiency; (3)
political legitimacy; (4) maintenance of the substantive–procedural
balance; (5) predictability; and (6) fundamental fairness.”25 Some ten
years later, there is no reason to depart from this broad framework as a
normative theoretical anchor for a critical analysis of the modern
procedural system.
On one level, it could be argued that decisionmaking accuracy
appears so obvious a consideration that it hardly requires explanation.
Nevertheless, it is helpful to articulate the foundational rationales for
inclusion of this factor. These rationales are both systemic and
individualist. From the perspective of the individual litigant (either
plaintiff or defendant) whose rights have been substantively distorted
because of inaccuracy in the fact-finding in her individual suit, the
procedural system loses most or all of its political legitimacy. From a
systemic perspective, absent decisionmaking accuracy in the individual
case, it is impossible to ensure implementation and vindication of the
substantive legal framework enacted by the democratic society. As
modes of implementing its chosen framework, governing authorities
often vest substantive rights in private individuals.26 Without the
accurate finding of facts in the individual suit, it is highly likely that the
substantive law will be either over-enforced (in cases in which the facts
are found incorrectly against the defendant) or under-enforced (in cases
in which the facts are found incorrectly against the plaintiff). Either
way, the underlying substantive law is subverted by the procedural
system.27
It is also necessary, however, to recognize the existence of
important competing socioeconomic goals. In certain contexts, the
unbending pursuit of factual accuracy will give rise to prohibitive costs
which, in turn, will lead to an impact far more harmful than beneficial
on the rest of society. These costs may be conceptualized as either
“internal” or “external.”28 The former category includes the burdens to
which the truth-finding process gives rise directly—that is, the costs and
burdens suffered by the litigants as a result of the devices and structures
adopted to achieve fact-finding accuracy.29 In shaping its procedural
24. Id. at 593–94.
25. Id. at 594.
26. See my elaboration of the role of private enforcement of systemic policies in MARTIN
H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 29–42 (2009).
27. Redish, supra note 5, at 595.
28. Redish, supra note 5, at 595–96.
29. Id. at 595.
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due process standards, the Supreme Court has long recognized the need
to strike some utilitarian balance between the search for truth and the
financial and structural burdens required to attain the truth.30 Even
where the burdens are not so great as to reach the level of a
constitutional violation, however, purely as a matter of social policy
those structuring the procedural system must take this concern into
account in shaping the devices designed to lead to the finding of truth.
At some point, it will simply be too costly for all concerned to take
every conceivable step toward truth-finding.
In contrast to these internal costs, external costs include losses
incurred by society beyond the scope of the individualized adjudicatory
process.31 In certain situations, use of a particular procedure designed to
attain factual accuracy will impose costs that extend beyond the four
walls of the courtroom, thereby undermining substantive interests which
society has chosen to protect. Evidentiary testimonial privileges provide
a perfect illustration of situations in which the system has made a choice
to value external interests over truth-finding.32
These external costs link the goal of utilitarian limits on the truthfinding process to the fourth foundational goal of a procedural system:
maintenance of the substantive–procedural balance. This factor is
premised on the recognition that procedural rules will often have an
inescapable collateral impact on interests that exist well beyond the
walls of the courthouse—in other words, on the substantive concerns
and goals society has sought to foster and implement.33 It would be a
serious mistake to ignore these collateral impacts, because they will
occur whether or not we acknowledge their existence. How a society
shapes its procedural system will inevitably risk over- or underenforcing its substantive law. Moreover, such “back door” procedural
alteration of governing substantive law is especially invidious in a
democratic society because it constitutes a change in the DNA of
applicable substantive law, not through the transparent democratic
processes of legislative modification (with all of the attendant controls
of democratic representation and accountability) but rather through
furtive or indirect means.34 Thus, though it may not always be possible
to achieve the proper balance, the goal in fashioning procedural rules
must be, to the extent reasonably possible, neither to over- or underenforce substantive law.

30. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see also Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1, 13–18 (1991).
31. Redish, supra note 5, at 597.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id. at 595.
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While the substantive–procedural interaction focuses primarily on
the shaping of citizens’ “primary conduct”35 (that is, their nonlitigation
behavior), the foundational goal of predictability focuses on the concern
that litigants receive clear and consistent messages as to how they
should prepare for litigation.36 To avoid this uncertainty, it is necessary,
to the extent feasible, to establish governing rules that provide litigants
with a clear understanding of what is expected from them. It is
important to comprehend, however, that it would be counterproductive
to adopt, in the name of predictability, narrow, mechanistic rules of
procedure. The most one can reasonably expect is for generally framed
rules to provide broad guidance that will be fleshed out through the
inductive process of case-by-case development.
While the final element in the litigation matrix, fundamental
fairness, is essential to the foundational analysis, it is simultaneously
fraught with danger.37 On the one hand, any system that fails to include
at least some concern for dictates of fundamental fairness in the
procedural system’s treatment of litigants ignores important elements of
the social contract between government and citizen that is necessarily
implicit in a democratic society. On the other hand, the concept of
fundamental fairness is, at least at its outer limits, so vague and
malleable that it far too easily can be invoked conclusorily for
manipulative or hidden purposes. Thus, to the extent the foundational
moral calculus underlying modern procedure includes considerations of
fundamental fairness the inquiry must be confined to situations where
one is able to articulate specific and logically defensible inferences from
explicit normative premises.
II. PLEADING AND THE LITIGATION MATRIX
A. Pleading and the Risk of the Wrong Guess
With the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, the federal judicial system dramatically altered the prevailing
theory of pleading. In doing so, it significantly modified the nature of
the relationship between procedure and the substantive law it was
created to implement. It has been thought by many, however, that the
Supreme Court in its 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly38
substantially reinterpreted and restructured the pleading requirements
that had been included in the original Federal Rules in ways that
35. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also
Redish, supra note 5, at 599.
36. Redish, supra note 5, at 599.
37. Id. at 599–600.
38. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that a plaintiff’s “factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true . . . ”) (citations omitted).
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dangerously undermined the core philosophical precepts underlying
those Rules.39 The Court followed its decision in Twombly two years
later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,40 and once again many considered the decision
to be inconsistent with the original Rules.
There is little doubt that a procedural system’s chosen pleading
standard can have a significant impact on the implementation of
underlying substantive law. At one extreme, pleading standards that
require a plaintiff to supply detailed facts about defendants’ illegal
behavior at a point in the process at which it would be difficult for the
plaintiff to know that information could result in serious underenforcement of substantive rights and proscriptions; legitimate suits
would be filtered out at an early stage of the process. At the other
extreme, overly lax pleading standards that enable a plaintiff to get past
the pleading stage by asserting nothing more than vague and
unsupported legal conclusions could invite so-called “strike suits,”
frivolous claims brought solely to coerce defendants into making
unjustified settlements to avoid the burdens and costs of the discovery
process.
In choosing a generally applicable pleading standard, it is difficult to
walk this procedural tightrope. Whichever pleading standard is
ultimately adopted, there will always exist a serious risk that in a
significant percentage of cases the result would either be over- or underdeterrence of substantively proscribed behavior. Either result would
upset the delicate balance between substance and procedure that is
central to the smooth functioning of a constitutional democracy. The
question then becomes, on which side of the equation is society willing
to risk being wrong? This form of weighing is visible in other legal
contexts. For example, the criminal system has made the categorical ex
ante judgment that society would prefer to let a guilty person go free
rather than send an innocent person to prison.41 In the pleading context,
the task is to fashion a workable standard under which the risks are
allocated in a manner that optimizes the symbiotic interaction between
procedure and the substantive law it is designed to enforce. This effort
can be referred to as a search for the party on whom to impose “the risk
of the wrong guess.” In the pleading context, where the court lacks
perfect knowledge of the facts, the question at the time of the motion to
dismiss is to determine whether it is likely more fair and efficient to risk
dismissing a deserving plaintiff on the one hand or imposing the
burdens of the pretrial process on a defendant who would ultimately
39. See discussion infra Section II.D.
40. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
41. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Alexander Volokh, n Guilty
Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 (1997) (discussing the controversy of releasing a guilty
man rather than imprisoning an innocent one).
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prevail on the merits.
On the civil side, whether one chooses a pleading system that risks
pushing deserving plaintiffs out of court prematurely or instead selects a
system that risks over-deterrence of defendant behavior (as well as the
resulting internal and external economic inefficiencies) depends on
certain foundational substantive assumptions about political and
socioeconomic theory. If one begins with a strong presumption in favor
of the value of wealth redistribution and an overriding concern that laws
regulating corporate or governmental behavior be enforced, then one is
likely to choose a pleading system that demands less of plaintiffs,
thereby placing a risk of over-enforcement on defendants. If, on the
other hand, one were to begin with an overriding substantive concern
about the costs and harms of over-deterrence and the possible waste of
litigation resources and believe that courts should not transfer wealth
absent a strong and clear reason to do so, then one is far more likely to
adopt a more demanding pleading standard. Such a standard would
place the risk of deciding incorrectly more on the plaintiffs who are
seeking to enforce the law.42
Throughout its history, the nation has made very different choices
about which party should bear the risk of the wrong guess at the
pleading stage. In the following Section, this Article discusses these
alternatives and tracks the shifts in the nation’s presumptions at
different points in history. In so doing, this Article will explore the
inherent intersection between the pleading standard and the enforcement
of controlling substantive law.
B. The Evolution of Pleading in the Federal Courts
1. The Shift from Fact Pleading
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, the generally
accepted pleading standard was “code pleading,” named for its origins
in the reform statutory codes of the nineteenth century, particularly the
Field Code in New York, which had been designed to replace the
common law writ system. This pleading standard was adopted in an
effort to democratize the litigation system by making it more
understandable and therefore more accessible to the common person.43
Instead of focusing on the conceptual niceties of legal pigeonholing that
42. It is, of course, true that whatever pleading standard is adopted applies to both
complaints and answers. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs are required to satisfy a fact pleading
standard, any affirmative defenses pled by defendants would have to satisfy a similar standard.
As a categorical matter, however, there can be little doubt that a more demanding pleading
standard will have a more significant impact on plaintiffs. If plaintiffs are unable to satisfy fact
pleading in their complaint, defendants will not even need to plead affirmative defenses.
43. RICHARD MARCUS, MARTIN REDISH, EDWARD SHERMAN & JAMES PFANDER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 125 (5th ed., West Publishing 2009).
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had characterized common law pleading, the codes shunned the
pleading of legal conclusions in favor of an intensive emphasis on the
need for detailed facts.44 Demurrers to the face of complaints on
grounds of a lack of factual specificity were commonplace, and as a
result the pleading stage played a significant role in the litigation
process. Not surprisingly, this focus on factually detailed allegations
often made it difficult for a plaintiff to proceed past the pleading stage
because at the outset of the case the plaintiff often lacked access to key
information concerning the defendant’s specific behavior, which
information was not readily available to the plaintiff or under the
control of the defendant.
Under the intellectual leadership of Charles Clark, the Federal Rules
dramatically altered the prevailing pleading dynamic.45 Instead of
demanding facts that stated a cause of action, the Rules now demanded
only that the pleadings provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”46 Under this system,
the motion to dismiss was to play a far smaller role than had the
demurrer in code pleading jurisdictions.47 Instead, the plaintiff was to
have access to an array of elaborate discovery devices,48 enforceable by
the court,49 to enable him to acquire the information needed to pursue
the case to trial. The only exceptions to this substantially softened
pleading standard were cases of fraud and mistake, which, pursuant to
Rule 9(b), remained subject to fact pleading requirements.50
As opponents of the Rules were quick to point out, the obvious
danger in this system was the invitation to meritless suits brought solely
for purposes of seeking coercive settlements or engaging in fishing
expeditions. Elaborate discovery devices often require substantial
investments of time, effort, and money on the part of litigants. Once the
44. Id.
45. The extent to which either Judge Clark or the other rule makers fully grasped the truly
dramatic nature of the change is unclear. On occasion, Judge Clark suggested that the changes
brought about by the Federal Rules were relatively minimal, and merely a natural evolution of
existing pleading rules. See Clark, supra note 4, at 308. It is, of course, conceivable that
understating the impact of the changes of the Federal Rules was merely an element of a strategy
to disarm opponents to the adoption of the Federal Rules’ pleading system. It is clear, however,
that those opposed to the Rules’ alteration of the pleading system fully grasped the magnitude of
the changes.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
47. Id. 12(b)(6). Judge Clark himself would have preferred to dispense with the motion to
dismiss altogether, instead relying solely on the summary judgment motion as a means of
filtering suits prior to trial. However, his preferred approach was not adopted by the Advisory
Committee, which chose to retain the motion to dismiss.
48. The discovery devices are presently governed by Rules 26–37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
50. Id. 9(b).
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motion to dismiss is effectively eliminated as a filter, there is nothing to
stop plaintiffs from initiating the process and quickly obtaining access
to potentially burdensome and expensive discovery. 51 But whatever the
legitimacy of the concern was at the time of the Rules’ adoption, with
the development of modern products liability law and class action
procedure, in at least a certain category of complex cases the problem of
discovery abuse has evolved into a real danger.52 While the Rule
drafters over the years have undertaken a number of significant and
often controversial measures to reduce the frequency of such abuse,53 in
Twombly Justice David Hackett Souter pointed out that their success
had been, to say the least, less than consistent.54
2. Understanding the Pleading Standard of the Federal Rules
The task facing both the drafters of the Rules and the courts asked to
interpret and enforce them is to devise a method that, to the extent
feasible at the outset of a litigation, imposes the risk of the wrong guess
on the party most likely (as best as one can predict at the pleading stage)
to be arguing the factually incorrect position. This effort to effectively
allocate risk will reduce the costs of over- or under-deterrence. Thus,
where a complaint alleges nonconclusory facts which, if true, makes the
court believe that the complaint “plausibly” alleges a valid claim—that
is, there is a reasonable likelihood that a legally cognizable wrong has
been committed—it is appropriate to permit the complaint to proceed,
even though the court or jury may ultimately determine that no wrong
was actually committed. On the other hand, where no reasonable basis
exists, on the face of the complaint’s factual allegations, to plausibly
suspect that a legal wrong has been committed, the risk of underdeterrence of the substantive law must be placed on the plaintiff. To be
51. See, e.g., Edward R. Finch, Some Fundamental and Practical Objections to the
Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 22
AM. BAR ASS’N J. 809, 809 (1936) (arguing that the Rules, “if finally adopted[,] will increase
litigation and subject those against whom claims are asserted to an increasing number of suits
based on unfounded claims,” and would increase “to an appreciable extent the volume of
litigation . . . because the preliminary draft [of the Rules] adds greatly to the nuisance value of
litigation brought without just cause” and “also increase so-called speculative litigation or
litigation based on suspicion rather than facts, with the hope that such fishing may reveal a good
cause of action . . . ”).
52. Justice Souter expressly acknowledged this fact in Twombly. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
53. Discovery reform of one form or another was undertaken by the Advisory Committee
in 1980, 1983, 1991, and 2000.
54. Justice Souter’s assertion is borne out by the relevant data. See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
GROUP, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 8 FIG. 4 (2010), available at
http://lfcj.digidoq.com/BLAP/Lawyers%20for%20Civil%20Justice/FRCP%20DATA%20Litiga
tion%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%20Companies%202010.pdf(trackingrising litigation
costs in the United States from 2000 to 2008).
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sure, the difference between these two possibilities will not always
amount to the difference between night and day. Undoubtedly, there
will be many close cases. But such difficulty rarely disqualifies a legal
standard, nor should it here.
It is important to note that use of this standard should not be
considered either a doctrinal innovation or a departure from the drafters’
intent underlying Rule 8(a) when it was originally adopted in 1938. The
so-called notice pleading system, when properly construed, should
not—nor was it likely ever intended to—serve as an “Open, Sesame” to
plaintiffs seeking to engage in the equivalent of legalized blackmail or
to conduct fishing expeditions through the wasteful and inefficient use
of the discovery process. Indeed, anyone who would reject this
“plausibility” standard55 as overly restrictive and under-protective of a
plaintiff’s substantive and procedural rights should be required to
articulate the elements of the less demanding standard with which they
would replace it. The only conceivably less restrictive alternative is a
standard that would permit a plaintiff merely to allege, in the most
vague and conclusory manner, that a defendant had committed a
violation of law. While presumably the plaintiff would need to assert
violation of a specific right, that requirement hardly provides either the
defendant or the system with meaningful protection against waste or
abuse (both internal and external) due to the inefficiencies and burdens
of what turns out to have been wasted discovery. It is simply too easy
for a plaintiff to camouflage a total absence of any real basis for suit
under a conclusory allegation of law violation. The realistic alternative
to a standard grounded in an assessment of a complaint’s plausibility,
then, is not this substantially less demanding version of notice pleading
(what can be appropriately described as “notice pleading minus”); use
of such a standard would amount to the imposition of no standard at all
and an invitation to procedural chaos. The only arguably viable
alternative to an approach grounded in reasonable suspicion is therefore
the even more demanding fact pleading standard of the pre-Federal
Rules days—a standard the Rules’ drafters wisely rejected in all but the
narrowest category of exceptions.56

55. Use of the term “plausibility” did not begin until the Supreme Court’s relatively recent
decision in Twombly. 550 U.S. at 557, 560, 564. See discussion infra Subsection II.C.1. It is my
position, however, that the Court’s “plausibility” standard is identical to the standard originally
intended to be embodied in Rule 8(a) and the standard the Court has traditionally applied. See
discussion infra Sections II.D–E.
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (imposing fact pleading standard on claims of fraud or
mistake). For an example of a pre-Federal Rules code demanding a fact pleading standard, see
An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this
State, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521 (“The complaint shall contain: . . . A statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action . . . .”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 2

860

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

It is important to understand that this plausibility standard (which
can properly be viewed as a “notice pleading plus” standard)
significantly differs from the considerably more demanding fact
pleading standard employed in both the pre-Federal Rules codes and
currently in Rule 9(b) for allegations of fraud or mistake. 57 This
difference can be conclusively demonstrated by hypothetically applying
both standards to the important post-Federal Rules pleading decision,
Conley v. Gibson.58 There the Supreme Court overturned a dismissal of
the complaint in a suit by African-American union members who
accused their union of conspiracy with their employer to engage in
racial discrimination in violation of applicable federal labor laws.
Though the complaint included no specific or direct factual allegations
describing the nature of the alleged discriminatory conspiracy, it did
allege that the railroad for which they had worked abolished forty-five
jobs held by African-Americans and secretly filled all those jobs with
whites.59 It further alleged that despite repeated pleas, “the Union,
acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them against these
discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection
comparable to that given white employees.”60 If the allegation that the
plaintiffs’ union made no efforts on the plaintiffs’ behalf despite the fact
that they all had been replaced by white workers was not in and of itself
sufficient to make a reasonable observer suspect of the defendant’s
behavior, the complaint also alleged a history of past discriminatory acts
on the part of the union.61
Who could reasonably dispute that the Conley plaintiffs had alleged
far more than enough to make a reasonable observer conclude that
unlawful behavior on the part of the defendants had been plausibly
alleged? To be sure, it may have turned out that proof at trial of the truth
of the complaint’s nonconclusory factual allegations, standing alone,
would not have amounted to evidence sufficient to reach a jury. But that
is not the question that the plausibility standard should be deemed to ask
at the pleading stage. Rather, plausibility demands only that the
complaint’s nonconclusory factual allegations make a reasonable
observer believe that the defendant likely violated plaintiff’s rights and
that discovery might reveal confirming evidence of that fact. But if the
adoption of the Federal Rules’ revised pleading standard altered the
preexisting fact pleading standard in any meaningful way, surely the
complaint in Conley must be found to have alleged enough to allow the
57. Id.
58. 355 U.S. 41, 45–48 (1957).
59. Id. at 42–45, 48.
60. Id. at 43.
61. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 434 (1986).
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plaintiffs to invoke the Federal Rules’ discovery devices in search of the
evidence they would need at trial.
In striking contrast to the plausibility standard, fact pleading
requires the allegation of substantial factual detail in describing a
defendant’s unlawful behavior: who did what, with or to whom, and
when they did it.62 In a fact pleading system the plaintiff is expected to
know, prior to filing suit, exactly what happened. For example, under a
fact pleading regime plaintiffs would not be allowed simply to allege, in
a conclusory manner, that their union had conspired to discriminate
against them, as was basically true of the complaint in Conley.63 Rather,
under a fact pleading regime the plaintiffs would have had to allege
specifically at what point the union had conspired and with whom, and
elaborate on the detailed nature of the conspiracy—something most
plaintiffs who had been the victims of a conspiracy would be unable to
do without access to discovery, even if they had suffered its
consequences.
The plausibility standard, in contrast, does not demand that the
plaintiffs possess knowledge of facts which they could not reasonably
be expected to know at the litigation’s outset. Rather, it demands merely
that the description of the facts plaintiffs do know—that is, the events
that plaintiffs know to have taken place—give rise to the plausible claim
that what took place resulted from unlawful behavior.64 Thus, under the
plausibility standard, in certain situations the plaintiff may still be
permitted to plead in terms of legal conclusions, something that is
foreign to a fact pleading system. For example, under a plausibility
standard a plaintiff may plead using such legally conclusory terms as
“conspiracy” or “negligence” without explaining in detail exactly how
the defendants’ behavior qualifies for such descriptions. But, the
plaintiff’s description of the consequences he suffered or of the manner
in which the surrounding situation has been altered by the defendant’s
actions must be reasonably suggestive of unlawful behavior. The
plaintiff will be permitted to rely on conclusory allegations where it
appears doubtful that the situation described factually in the complaint
62. See Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762, 764 (N.C. 1963) (“[T]he facts
constituting a cause of action, rather than the conclusions of the pleader, must be set out in the
complaint, so as to disclose the issuable facts determinative of the plaintiff’s right to relief.”).
63. 355 U.S. at 46.
64. Such a standard is consistent with the assertion by respected commentators that
because “speculation” in a complaint’s allegations is insufficient to satisfy a motion to dismiss,
allegations that raise nothing more than mere “suspicion” are insufficient. CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2008).
“Speculation” amounts to an allegation that renders the defendant’s unlawful behavior possible;
on the other hand, a “plausible claim” standard requires a reasonable basis for believing that, if
the allegation is ultimately supported by evidence, a reasonable fact finder could consider the
allegedly unlawful behavior on the defendant’s part more likely than not.
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would have taken place absent some departure from the legally required
norm. Thus, while the Conley complaint survives under a plausibility
standard, it fails the far more demanding fact pleading standard.
Properly understood, the plausibility standard asks merely whether
the allegations contained in the complaint describe a situation that on its
face gives rise to a finding of sufficient suspicion of unlawful behavior
by the defendant to justify taking the case to the discovery stage. The
inquiry can be thought of in terms of “risk-reward”: the more suspicious
the circumstances alleged, the more likely it is that the risks associated
with incurring the costs of discovery will be justified, because the more
likely it is that use of the discovery process will bear fruit. The
plausibility standard, then, is simply a matter of playing the odds as best
they can be assessed with the limited knowledge the court possesses at
the point at which a complaint is filed. Thus, the inquiry a court is to
make under a plausibility approach differs significantly in its
expectations of what the plaintiff must provide at the pleading stage
from its expectations of what the plaintiff must be able to prove at trial.
A standard grounded in an effort to ascertain plausibility at the
pleading stage is fully justified by the political and socioeconomic
values that make up the underlying litigation matrix.65 The approach
strikes an appropriate balance between competing interests. Any
standard less demanding would be far too lax in allowing plaintiffs with
questionable claims to proceed to discovery, with all of its
accompanying inefficiencies and undue burdens. Similarly, a more
factually demanding standard would, in most cases, risk skewing the
substantive–procedural balance in the opposite direction.
It is certainly true that under a plausibility standard erroneous
dismissal of a certain number of meritorious suits will occur. Judges are
human and therefore fallible; at this early stage of the litigation, with an
absence of complete information, even educated guesses still remain, at
some level, guesses. Thus, there will always exist the risk that pleading
requirements will, in an individual case, under-enforce the underlying
substantive law. The Rules’ adoption of the plausibility standard,
however, represents the logical outgrowth of the commonsense
conclusion that we should be willing to risk a certain degree of underenforcement. Incurring such a risk is necessary to avoid the burdens and
inefficiencies that would be caused by the significantly greater amount
of over-enforcement flowing from a less demanding pleading standard.
Plausibility is thus far more consistent with a notice pleading
standard than it is with a fact pleading standard. But it is appropriately
distinguished from a standard that demands nothing more from a
plaintiff than a wholly unsupported, conclusory allegation of a legal
65. See supra Part I.
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wrong. Presumably, both standards could be described as notice
pleading, but, as previously noted, the plausibility standard is properly
labeled “notice pleading plus,” while the absurdly lax standard is
appropriately described as “notice pleading minus.”
C. The Supreme Court’s Recent Pleading Decisions
1. Twombly
Twombly was the first decision to expressly articulate Rule 8(a)’s
pleading standard in terms of plausibility. But, as this Article will
explain, the standard is consistent with the holdings of all major
pleading precedents.
The case involved an allegation of a conspiracy in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.66 The Supreme Court has long made clear
that in order to violate the Sherman Act’s prohibition of contracts,
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, the defendants must
have actually conspired;67 mere “conscious parallelism,” whereby the
defendants intentionally act in a parallel manner absent any
communication among them, is not actionable.68 Of course, a pattern of
parallel behavior is certainly consistent with the existence of an actual
conspiracy, so the question arises whether an allegation of consciously
parallel behavior combined with a conclusory assertion of conspiracy
suffices to satisfy Rule 8(a). In Twombly, the Court considered whether
a complaint that conclusorily alleged the existence of an actual
controversy on the basis of defendant’s parallel anticompetitive
behavior could defeat a motion to dismiss.69 In holding that an antitrust
complaint failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8(a), the Court
reasoned that:
While a complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does
not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to
relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .70

66. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
67. Id. at 553.
68. Id. at 553–54 (2007) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)).
69. Id. at 548–49.
70. Id. at 555 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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To satisfy the notice pleading standard imposed by Rule 8(a) (the
“plus” version of that standard, it should be noted)71 the Court
concluded, a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act must provide
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made.”72 Justice Souter, speaking for the Court, emphasized that
“[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of illegal agreement.”73 The Court drew a distinction between
allegations “plausibly suggesting” unlawful behavior on the one hand
and those “merely consistent with” such behavior on the other.74 The
former satisfy pleading requirements; the latter do not.75
Applying its plausibility standard to the facts alleged in Twombly’s
complaint, the Court found that “without some further factual
enhancement” beyond the mere assertion of parallel conduct by
defendants, the complaint “stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”76 This shortcoming was due
to the fact that “nothing contained in the complaint invest[ed] either the
action or inaction [on the part of the defendants] alleged with a
plausible suggestion of conspiracy.”77
2. Iqbal
The plaintiff in Iqbal, a Muslim and a citizen of Pakistan, was
arrested on criminal charges by federal officials after the attacks of
September 11, 2001.78 He alleged that he had been arrested and abused
while in custody as part of a sweeping policy established by defendants
John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller—at the time, respectively Attorney
General and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation—to detain
Muslims such as the plaintiff in highly restrictive conditions for no
reason other than their religion.79
In dismissing the complaint, the Court applied Twombly’s
plausibility standard. “A claim has facial plausibility,” wrote Justice
Anthony Kennedy on behalf of the majority, “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”80 The Court
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See text accompanying notes 56–57.
550 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id (alteration in original).
Id. at 566.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 678.
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added: “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . Where a complaint
pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’”81 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Justice Kennedy
noted, “do not suffice.”82
Applying these dictates to the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court found
the allegations insufficient. His claims, Justice Kennedy concluded,
were “bare assertions” that “amount[ed] to nothing more than a
‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination
claim.”83 The plaintiff’s allegations provided no basis, Justice Kennedy
reasoned, on which to surmise that either Attorney General Ashcroft or
Director Mueller had been a part of any scheme against Muslim men on
the basis of nothing more than their religion.
D. The Proper Interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal
As previously noted, the large majority of scholarly commentary on
both of these decisions has been mercilessly critical.84 The view of
many commentators is that in both Twombly and Iqbal the Court
abandoned the salutary goals of the notice pleading system adopted in
the original Federal Rules in 1938. Despite all the critical commentary
surrounding the Court’s opinions, however, a closer look reveals that in
Twombly and Iqbal the Court did nothing more than impose the
pleading standard that should be deemed to have been in force since the
original adoption of Rule 8(a) in 1938. Although its use of the
“plausibility” label was new, the substance of the standard was not. The
key advance in these decisions was that while the governing standard
had always been plagued by ambiguity as to exactly how lenient its
demands of factual detail actually were, after Twombly and Iqbal all
uncertainty was removed.
The manner in which all of the Court’s pleading decisions may be
reconciled is by understanding Rule 8(a)’s pleading standard as the
imposition of a requirement consistent with the “risk of the wrong
guess” analysis described previously.85 Pursuant to that analysis, the
complaint must allege facts sufficient to justify the imposition on the
defendant of the risk of a mistaken decision on its motion to dismiss.
To satisfy this standard, the allegations must amount to more than
simply the unsupported and conclusory assertion of law violation. But
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 681 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
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that does not mean that a plaintiff’s reliance on the pleading of a legal
conclusion, in and of itself, will automatically lead to a complaint’s
dismissal. The issue is far more complicated than such an all-or-nothing
approach would suggest. In certain situations, a complaint’s allegations
do not necessarily have to include claims of specific facts concerning
the commission of unlawful acts on the part of the defendant. Rather, in
a manner conceptually analogous to the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur at trial, it is conceivable that a description of nothing more than
the circumstances as the plaintiff knows them to be at the time of the
filing of the complaint could permit an objective observer to reasonably
suspect that unlawful behavior might have occurred. The observer could
reach this conclusion by reasoning that the results described in the
complaint are unlikely to have occurred absent unlawful behavior, and
that discovery could provide evidentiary support for the complaint’s
allegations.
While the Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal may at some
levels be susceptible to confusing and inconsistent misinterpretation,
when properly understood these decisions should actually reduce, rather
than increase, doctrinal confusion. After Twombly and Iqbal, complaints
lacking specific detail should be deemed sufficient to allow the pleader
to proceed to discovery when and only when they allege nonconclusory
facts that render the allegation of legal wrongdoing “plausible.” Under
this standard, where factual gaps exist in the plaintiff’s allegations, the
complaint will be deemed valid when and only when (1) the very
allegation of the resulting harm to plaintiff and its surrounding
circumstances gives rise to reasonable suspicion of unlawful behavior
on the part of one of the participants in the relevant events, and (2) it is
reasonable to believe that use of discovery devices will allow the
plaintiff to fill in sufficient evidentiary detail to get past a summary
judgment motion and to proceed to trial.
E. Reconciling the Prior Pleading Decisions
The Twombly Court did not need to heighten the existing pleading
standard from notice pleading (at least the “plus” version of that test)86
to plausibility, because since its inception the standard of Rule 8(a) has
generally been construed to demand satisfaction of something
approaching a reasonable plausibility standard. Close examination of
the leading pleading decisions since the inception of the Federal Rules
reveals that existing doctrine is consistent with—if not inexorably
dictated by—the “suspect circumstances” or “plausibility” version of
notice pleading.

86. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.
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“Plausibility,” then, is simply a new description of an established
approach. As already demonstrated, the poster child for notice pleading,
Conley v. Gibson, quite clearly qualifies under a plausibility standard.87
The second most famous notice pleading decision of the period,
authored by Judge Charles Clark, is the Second Circuit’s decision in
Dioguardi v. Durning.88 There, an immigrant alleged in a self-drafted
complaint that two cases of his “tonics” being shipped through customs
had mysteriously disappeared.89 While the immigrant provided nothing
in the way of supporting detail, there was no reason to expect that he
could supply it without having access to discovery. Judge Clark,
invoking the revised pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules, rejected
a motion to dismiss.90 The complaint in Dioguardi clearly satisfied the
plausibility standard as it has been explained in this Article. At the very
least, one could reasonably conclude that the situation warranted further
investigation through resort to the Federal Rules’ discovery processes.
In short, there existed enough suspicion to shift the risk of the wrong
guess to the defendants.
The most recent major decision in which the Supreme Court applied
the precepts of notice pleading before Twombly was Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, N.A.,91 a decision that was expressly reaffirmed in Twombly.92
The plaintiff, a fifty-three-year-old native of Hungary, sued his former
employer, a reinsurance company headquartered in New York and
principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, for
discrimination on the basis of national origin pursuant to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act93 and on the basis of age pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.94 He had served as the
company’s chief underwriting officer until he was replaced by a much
younger individual with only one year of underwriting experience at the
time he was promoted.95 In contrast, the plaintiff had twenty-six years
of experience at the time.96 The district court dismissed the complaint
because the plaintiff “ha[d] not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in
that he ha[d] not adequately alleged circumstances that support an
inference of discrimination.”97
87. See supra text accompanying notes 57–64.
88. 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
89. Id. at 774.
90. Id. at 775–76.
91. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
92. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
93. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 509; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
94. 534 U.S. at 509; see also 29 U.S.C. § 621.
95. 534 U.S. at 508.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 509 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 86 Fair Empl. Prac. Case. (BNA) 1324
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
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In rejecting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court
made clear that the complaint was not to be judged by the strict fact
pleading standard of Rule 9(b), which is textually reserved for
allegations of fraud or mistake.98 The Court held that a complaint
controlled by Rule 8(a) need not include facts establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination. Unhelpfully, in its explanation the Court did
little more than repeat the language of Rule 8(a) by stating that the
complaint “must contain only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”99 The Court pointed to
the Federal Rules’ system of “simplified notice pleading” that “relies on
liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”100
Because the plaintiff’s complaint “gives [defendant] fair notice of the
basis” for his claims, the motion to dismiss should be denied.101
Focusing solely on this language, it would seem arguable that
Swierkiewicz is in conflict with both Twombly and Iqbal, despite the
Twombly Court’s insistence that Swierkiewicz is reconcilable with its
plausibility standard.102 After all, as vague as its allegations may have
been, it is true that the complaint in Twombly gave the defendant “fair
notice” of the type of conspiracy that the plaintiffs were alleging. 103 But
if one examines closely the situation in Swierkeiwicz, one can see that
the facts pleaded in the complaint actually do satisfy a plausibility
standard. The complaint alleged that (1) the plaintiff was of an age
where age discrimination was a reasonable possibility, and (2) the
plaintiff was far more qualified to serve in his position than the younger
individual who replaced him. These allegations give rise to more than
the mere possibility that age discrimination had occurred. At the very
least, these allegations give rise to a suspicion of unlawful conduct
sufficient to allow the plaintiff to get to the next stage of the process,
discovery, to ascertain whether there was fire behind the smoke.
Whether the complaint’s allegations, if supported by evidence at
trial, would have been sufficient to resist a summary judgment motion is
open to question. Under the standard of proof for trial established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,104 an employment discrimination
suit at trial must establish a prima facie case, meaning that the plaintiff

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 513; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 514–15.
See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007).
See discussion supra Subsection II.C.1.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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must present evidence that supports “an inference of discrimination.”105
If, at trial, a plaintiff presented evidence that did nothing more than
establish that he qualified for protection against discrimination and that
he was considerably more qualified for the position than his
replacement, a jury could quite probably infer discrimination on the part
of the defendant.106 In any event, at the very least Swierkiewicz appears
to stand for the proposition that all a plaintiff must do is aver suspect
circumstances, rather than allege the specific elements of a prima facie
case. Thus, to the extent Twombly is ambiguous on the point, it is
reasonable to choose to construe it, in accordance with Swierkiewicz
(which the Twombly Court deemed to be good law), as satisfying the
requirements of the plausibility standard.
In the post-Twombly decision of Erickson v. Pardus,107 the Court
once again appeared to mysteriously return to the rhetoric of the lax
version of notice pleading (which this Article refers to as “notice
pleading minus”). In his civil rights complaint, a prisoner alleged that he
had been removed from a year-long treatment plan for hepatitis C, and
that as a result his illness worsened.108 The Court, in a per curiam
opinion, oddly spoke in terms strongly reminiscent of the deferential
notice pleading minus standard, under which a plaintiff is allowed to
plead legal conclusions as long as he provides notice to the defendant of
what it is alleged he had done unlawfully, and did so without any effort
to distinguish Twombly.109 Yet the holdings of the two decisions are
easily reconcilable on the basis of the Twombly Court’s plausibility
standard. In Twombly, the Court found that in a complaint alleging an
unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade, although an allegation of
parallelism was consistent with illegal conspiracy, it was equally

105. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“In subsequent
cases, this Court has reiterated that the prima facie case relates to the employee's burden of
presenting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination.”).
106. See, e.g., Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that an
issue of material fact existed as to whether a female government employee was eligible for a
higher-level position for which an agency hired an outside male candidate, and whether the
female employee was substantially more qualified for the job, precluding summary judgment on
the employee’s Title VII claim of discriminatory nonpromotion.); see also, e.g., Scheidemantle
v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 541–42 (3d Cir. 2006)
(finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a female employee was more
qualified for a university’s locksmith position, precluding summary judgment in favor of the
female in her Title VII claim for failure to promote due to gender discrimination.); Wilson v.
B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004).
107. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
108. Id. at 89–90.
109. It is true that the Court pointed to the plaintiff’s special status as a pro se litigant. Id. at
94. However, the Court did so in addition to, rather than as a rationale for, its description of the
generally lax pleading standard.
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consistent with purely lawful behavior on the defendants’ part.110 In
contrast, in Erickson, according to the complaint, the plaintiff, who
suffered from hepatitis C, had been removed from a one-year treatment
plan by prison officials, and his illness worsened. It is, of course,
possible that his illness would have worsened anyway had the treatment
ultimately failed. But at the pleading stage, at least, it is reasonable to
infer that since prison doctors had chosen to place the plaintiff on this
extended treatment plan in the first place, there was a legitimate chance
that it would have had a beneficial effect on the plaintiff’s medical
condition. Otherwise, one would have to make the counterintuitive
assumption that prison officials chose to waste taxpayers’ money and
medical resources in a wholly worthless effort.
Whether a causal relationship in fact existed between removal from
treatment and worsening of the illness would be an issue to be resolved
at a later point in the proceeding (either on summary judgment or at
trial). But surely it would be difficult to deny that such a link was
“plausible.” Under the circumstances, the risk of making a wrong
decision could appropriately be shifted to the defendant.111
III. DISCOVERY AND THE LITIGATION MATRIX
A. Discovery and the Substantive–Procedural Balance
Discovery is reminiscent of the invention of fire. Like fire, when
used with proper restraint discovery can be enormously valuable to
achievement of the goals of the litigation matrix. But also like fire,
when used carelessly or recklessly discovery can give rise to serious
harm and destruction.
As explained in this Article, the concepts of revised pleading and
discovery went hand in hand in the procedural model implemented in
the original Federal Rules. It was quite clear that by simultaneously
reducing the barriers imposed by the fact pleading requirement and
establishing a complex set of court-enforced information-gathering
devices, Judge Clark and the Advisory Committee attempted both to
increase procedural fairness to plaintiffs and employ procedure as a
more effective means of implementing substantive law. To illustrate,
one need only point to the facts of Conley.112 Recall that the plaintiffs
there could never have satisfied the requirements of fact pleading; they
had no way of knowing the specific details of their union’s
conspiratorial involvement with their employer at the outset of the
litigation because such conspiracies are by their nature secret. Yet to
deny them the opportunity to employ the discovery devices provided for
110. See discussion supra Subsection II.C.1.
111. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.
112. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2.
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in the Federal Rules under those circumstances would have been
fundamentally unfair to those plaintiffs and a disruption of the
enforcement of applicable substantive law. The availability of
discovery, then, was essential to the procedural vindication of the
Conley plaintiffs’ substantive rights; the process thus restored the
substantive–procedural balance, which rightfully plays an important
role in shaping the underlying litigation matrix of values.
Because of the potential burdens of discovery, an unduly lax
pleading standard cannot be imposed without seriously skewing the
substantive–procedural balance towards pathological over-enforcement
of the substantive law.113 As important a role as discovery is designed to
play—and does play—in the effective procedural implementation of
substantive law, the very same danger of pathological over-enforcement
exists with regard to discovery.
B. Discovery and the Remaining Elements of the Litigation Matrix
As significant as a focus on the substantive–procedural balance is in
order to fully understand the impact of the litigation matrix on
discovery, it is equally important to recognize the relevance of the
remaining elements of the litigation matrix to the analysis of
discovery’s potential risks and rewards. No matter how restrictively
employed, discovery will come at a cost: in the narrow and immediate
sense, the costs imposed on the litigants and the system will be greater
when discovery is employed than when it is not. The decision to bear
such inherent costs was made by the drafters of the Rules in 1938 when
they inserted Rules 26–36.114 As a purely theoretical matter, at least,
this seems to have been a wise call. Court-enforced informationgathering devices can play a vitally important role in enabling
individuals intended to be protected by the substantive law to enforce
their rights; simultaneously, they may also play a significant role in
enabling defendants to protect themselves against illegitimate
judgments or over-enforcement of substantive restrictions on their
behavior.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that discovery should be
free from significant restriction or control. To the contrary, if left
wholly unregulated discovery can give rise to numerous procedural and
substantive pathologies. In its most extreme form, intentionally abusive
discovery effectively transforms the adjudicatory system into a means
of facilitating legalized blackmail and extortion. The very threat of
costly discovery likely induces rationally self-interested defendants to
settle even nonmeritorious suits for an amount smaller than the
113. See discussion supra Section II.A.
114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–36 (regulating disclosure and discovery).
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projected costs of discovery. Thus, requests for wholly unnecessary
discovery could function in an extortionate manner, financially coercing
a defendant into settling unjustified claims. It should therefore hardly be
surprising that abusive discovery contravenes virtually all of the
elements of the litigation matrix—fundamental fairness, efficiency, and
maintenance of the substantive–procedural balance. It is fundamentally
unfair to a defendant to allow the adjudicatory system to be employed
against him as a weapon of coercion.
No one, presumably, would openly sanction or condone
unambiguously and intentionally abusive discovery. The problem, of
course, is finding ways to control such pathological discovery without
either effectively destroying the beneficial effects of the discovery
process or establishing control methods that are as economically
inefficient as the abusive discovery itself. This task has proven to be far
more difficult than one might have hoped. It is to consideration of this
difficult issue that the analysis now turns.
C. Controlling Discovery: The Alternative Models
The most frustrating aspect of the long and sad history of discovery
control is the Rule makers’ total failure to recognize, much less
implement, a model of discovery control that (1) would curb not only
intentionally abusive discovery, but the probably more pervasive
category of excessive discovery as well, and (2) would do so with only
a relatively limited increase in the procedural costs and burdens
imposed on the adjudicatory system. Such a model does exist. This
method of discovery control, which is most appropriately called “the
cost-allocation” model, is predominately a self-executing system. In this
sense, the model can be contrasted to four other variants, which can be
called the “direct interventionist” model, the “direct restrictive” model,
the “interventionist prophylactic” model and the “automatic
prophylactic” model. The first and second of these alternative models
involve direct restrictions on litigants’ ability to engage in discovery,
while the third and fourth alternative models involve efforts to prevent
discovery abuse before it happens. The third alternative model is
designed to deter discovery abuse through the establishment of
judicially managed structure, while the fourth alternative seeks to
prophylactically prevent abuse through the use of purely litigant-based
procedures.
1. The “Direct Interventionist” Model
The “direct interventionist” model can be described as managerial in
the sense that it requires the court to directly involve itself in the control
of discovery. The model is manifested in two different ways in the
Federal Rules. One version, generally referred to as the
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“proportionality” requirement, is currently implemented through Rule
26(b)(2).115 The provision requires the court—either on motion of a
party or on its own—to restrict discovery when, on the basis of a
balancing of specified factors, it determines that discovery is
unwarranted.116 The second version of this model is embodied in Rule
26(c)’s authorization of a judicial protective order, designed to prevent
or stop specific abusive practices.117 The latter provision is the one
method of discovery control that has existed since the Rules’ original
adoption in 1938.118 This provision, designed to provide courts with an
additional method of intervening to prevent unwarranted discovery,
stands as the last line of defense against specific instances of abusive or
unjustified discovery.
Both of the Rule-based versions of this model arguably perform
legitimate roles in controlling unwarranted discovery. Rule 26(c) does
so by leaving the court with virtually unlimited discretion to make
individualized judgment calls. Rule 26(b)(2), on the other hand, is
arguably more problematic because it purports to provide a level of
objectivity that simply fails to comport with the realities of the test. Far
from providing any sort of objective guidance, the test necessarily
requires the court to balance factors that are inherently subjective,
without the slightest guidance as to how they are to be measured or how
they are to be weighed against each other. At the very least, the process
threatens to undermine the predictability element of the litigation
matrix.119 In a sense, both versions of the model pose a prima facie
threat to the internal efficiency element of the litigation matrix120
because they are inherently labor-intensive—for the court, as well as for
the litigants.
The primary problem with this method of discovery control,
however, is neither its lack of predictability nor its potential
inefficiencies. Rather, the problem is simply its failure to do an effective
job of controlling discovery abuse. This does not mean that the methods
should be abandoned. To the contrary, at the very least the Rule 26(c)
protective order provision provides an enormously valuable method of
controlling abusive discovery in the individual instance. It means,
rather, that the direct interventionist model must be significantly
supplemented if unwarranted discovery is to be controlled effectively.
115. For a discussion of the “proportionality” requirement, see Martin H. Redish & Colleen
McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 780–81 (2011).
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 30.
119. See discussion supra Part I.
120. See discussion supra Part I.
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2. The “Direct Restrictive” Model
At first glance, the “direct restrictive” model appears to be far less
labor-intensive than the various versions of the direct interventionist
model, because its different manifestations are, on their face, selfexecuting. These Rule-based manifestations include the certification
requirement of Rule 26(g), which requires certification of all discovery
requests and responses indicating that they are not interposed for
improper purposes.121 These Rule-based manifestations also include the
presumptive limitations imposed on the amount of discovery, expressly
included in the rules describing the particular discovery devices122—
limitations which the court has discretion to alter in an individual
instance. In both instances, however, as a result of these limitations both
the court and the litigants may become involved in potentially
burdensome satellite litigation concerning either possible sanctions for
violation of the certification requirement or the possible need to alter the
presumptive limitations expressly imposed in the specific discovery
rules.
Once again, the primary difficulty with this method of discovery
control is probably not the potential burdens and inefficiencies of
resultant satellite litigation, however real those dangers may or may not
be. Rather, the primary problem is the inherently clumsy nature of this
form of restriction. The Rule 26(g) certification requirement, for
example, gives rise simultaneously to serious risks of over-protection
and under-protection. On the one hand, it is far from inconceivable that
risk-averse litigants, for fear of possible sanctions, will refrain from
making discovery requests that, with perfect knowledge, they would
have known would be perfectly legitimate. On the other hand, parties
operating in bad faith may comply with the certification requirement in
the belief that they will be able to circumvent sanctions. Absent
effective enforcement of the certification requirement, those parties will
be able to undermine the salutary purposes served by that requirement.
The problem with the presumptive limitations imposed on the amount
of discovery, in contrast, is the “one size fits all” nature of those
limitations. As previously noted, the court has authority to alter those
limits in an individual instance; however, that option inherently brings
with it arguably unnecessary internal transaction costs, which are
unavoidable in making the decision whether to authorize the alteration.
As in the case of the direct interventionist model, it does not
necessarily follow that these forms of discovery control should be
abandoned. It means, rather, that these models need to be supplemented
in some way in order to achieve the goal of assuring the discovery
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
122. See id.
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process’s compliance with the dictates of the litigation matrix.
3. The Prophylactic Models of Discovery Control
i. The “Interventionist Prophylactic” Model
In contrast to the direct models, a prophylactic model of discovery
control seeks to prevent or deter discovery excesses before they occur.
The “interventionist prophylactic model” involves the use of the
discovery conference methodology that, in one form or another, has
been around since the 1980 amendment to the Federal Rules.123 While
the procedure neither directly restricts discovery as a whole nor
provides for intervention into specific situations in order to stop
particular discovery abuse, its rationale is that by ordering the substance
of the discovery process from the outset the model may deter
pathological aberrations later on.
Though it is difficult to make definitive empirical assessments, it is
possible that use of the discovery conference has had some beneficial
impact on the discovery process. Even assuming that to be true,
however, there is no doubt that the benefit comes at a cost, in terms of
both judicial and attorney time. Moreover, because the process does not
involve direct attacks on discovery abuse, it is very difficult to ascertain
the true benefits the methodology brings about. That problem, after all,
is inherent in the use of any prophylactic method.
ii. The “Automatic Prophylactic” Model
The automatic disclosure device, originally adopted (in a more
controversial version) in 1993 and currently embodied in Rule
26(a)(1),124 seeks to avoid the burdens and confrontations that often
accompany the discovery process by imposing on the litigants the
obligation to automatically disclose certain basic information which,
most likely, would have been requested in any event.
There are likely marginal benefits of efficiency derived from this
anticipatory process, but it is difficult to see how it can deter or avoid
the problems of inefficiency and distortion threatened by unwarranted
or abusive discovery. It is therefore necessary to search for an
alternative means of discovery control, one that functions differently
from the four current regulatory models.
4. The Cost Allocation Model and the Control of “Excessive” Discovery
One can readily see why these alternative models of discovery
control, either standing alone or in combination, fail to control
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) & advisory committee’s note to 1980 Amendment.
124. See id. at 26(a)(1) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
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discovery in an effective and efficient manner. All of these models
create the risk of being over-effective, under-effective, economically
inefficient, or even all three at once. This does not mean that the models
fail to serve any legitimate role in the overall scheme of discovery
control. At the very least, however, it does mean that something more is
needed in order to ensure that discovery in large or complex litigation is
not permitted to degenerate into a pathological process of procedural
inefficiency or substantive distortion. Thus, it is necessary to turn to an
alternative method of discovery control that has mysteriously been all
but ignored since the very inception of the Federal Rules: the allocation
of the costs of discovery not to the responding party (the
overwhelmingly accepted practice), but rather to the requesting party.
From the outset, it is important to understand that this Article does
not here advocate a process of cost shifting; indeed, the very use of that
word would necessarily concede that the inertia of cost allocation
appropriately belongs on the responding party, and must be shifted in
order to have discovery costs attributed to the requesting party. Yet at
no point has anyone—including those who drafted the Federal Rules in
the first place—even attempted to rationalize the respondent-centric
model of cost allocation which has dominated since the Rules’ original
promulgation. Were one actually to consider the issue afresh, it would
be difficult to understand the assumptions inherent in such a model.
Although in the crudest, most concrete sense the cost is immediately
incurred by the responding party rather than the requesting party, that
fact, standing alone, in no way necessarily implies that (even at that
point) the cost is appropriately attributed to the responding party.
One may best understand the point by consideration of a simple
analogy. Assume a coworker asks you to do him a favor and pick up
lunch for him. You do so, paying the $15 that the lunch costs. You then
bring the lunch to your coworker; unless he was raised by wolves, he
will immediately thank you and reimburse you for your $15 expenditure
on his behalf. Is such reimbursement appropriately characterized as
“cost shifting” in anything but the most concrete, technical, and
immediate sense? At any point in this hypothetical transaction, was the
cost of that lunch appropriately viewed, morally or conceptually, as
your cost, rather than your coworker’s cost? Long-established principles
of quantum meruit would readily answer that question in the
negative.125 You performed work on behalf of another, who was aware
both that you were performing that work on his behalf and, as a result,
incurring costs on his behalf. The law of quasi-contract unambiguously
dictates that in such a situation the cost is deemed that of the party on
behalf of whom the work was done, not of the party who performed the
125. Redish & McNamara, supra note 115, at 777.
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work.126
In fundamental ways, the discovery process is identical to this
hypothetical situation. The only differences are that in the case of
discovery, the performing party is usually performing the work not out
of the goodness of his heart, but rather due to the coercive threat of
court sanction if he fails to do so. Moreover, the work performed by the
responding party will not only help the requesting party, but often
actually harm the interests of the responding party himself. These
differences, however, make even more bizarre the seemingly universal
yet wholly unsupported assumption that discovery costs are
appropriately attributed to the responding party rather than to the
requesting party.
It should be clear that as both a legal and moral matter, the costs of
discovery are properly attributable, in the first instance, to the
requesting party. By imposing the costs of discovery on the responding
party, then, our system effectively requires the responding party to
provide a subsidy to the requesting party. To be sure, assuming no
constitutional problems,127 the system may choose to order such a
subsidy. But because those who created the system implicitly—and
inaccurately—assumed that the cost of discovery was properly seen as a
cost to be borne by the responding party, our system provides for a
hidden subsidy, one recognized by no one. At the very least, democracy
demands that the decisions of those who make fundamental choices of
social policy make clear what those choices actually are, so a
transparent debate of whether it is fair to impose such a subsidy may
finally take place. This has never been done in the case of discovery
costs.
Wholly apart from this complete lack of transparency, the implicit
assumption that the costs of discovery are to be attributed to the
responding party makes little sense, from any theoretical or practical
perspective, particularly when coupled with the broad scope of
discovery in the age of informational technology. In addition to its
moral and legal bases, attribution of the costs of discovery to the
discovering party, rather than the responding party, is likely to have
significant instrumental benefits because it would cure a fundamental
economic pathology plaguing the discovery process: the externality
inherent in the choice to invoke discovery. Simply put, under the
prevailing practice the cost–benefit decision of whether or not to invoke
the discovery process is made by a party who risks incurring no cost,
only benefit, even though it is quite conceivable that the choice will
impose a significant cost on others. This lack of economic disincentive
underscores what may be a far greater harm to the system than
126. Id.
127. But see infra text accompanying note 130.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 2

878

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

intentionally abusive discovery: “excessive” discovery. This concept
includes discovery that, while not consciously interposed for purposes
of delay or harassment, nevertheless gives rise to costs greater than its
benefits in finding truth. Recall that in the foundational litigation
matrix, the value of finding truth cannot be considered in a vacuum,
wholly divorced from the costs to which the effort gives rise. 128 Some
rough judgment must always be made by some decisionmaker as to
whether the likely benefit resulting from the effort justifies the effort’s
costs. Yet when the responding party, rather than the requesting party,
bears the costs of this process, the requesting party has absolutely no
economic disincentive not to make the request, regardless of its costs.
Indeed, given that it is the requesting party’s opponent who will bear
that cost, one might even perversely suggest that the higher the cost, the
greater the incentive to invoke the discovery process.
This focus on the subtle but important differences between
“abusive” and “excessive” discovery underscores the manner in which a
reversal in the ex ante presumption of discovery cost attribution can
function in a symbiotic manner with both the direct and prophylactic
methods of discovery control.129 While those more judicially-driven
practices are more likely to punish or deter abusive discovery, it is the
self-executing shift in discovery cost allocation that is far more likely to
deter the practice of excessive discovery.
The key social problem to which imposition of discovery costs on
the requesting party might give rise derives from its inherently
regressive nature: the poor will be more immediately and seriously
impacted by such costs than will the rich. To be sure, this is also true of
all litigation costs, though this fact has never prompted a shift of all of
the poor’s litigation costs to the wealthier party. Moreover, particularly
in the case of complex class action lawsuits, the real party in interest
will not be the individual plaintiff but rather the plaintiff’s attorneys, for
whom the funding of such suits is simply a cost of doing business. In
these cases, it would be wrong to see this alteration in discovery cost
allocation as an inherently regressive practice. In any event, if there are
particular substantive rights which the governmental body decides
require procedural subsidization, that body may say so at the time it
creates those rights. Therefore, even if one were to find the regressive
impact of this reversal in cost allocation to be a matter of concern, a
wholesale rejection of the cost allocation model would not be justified.
Even if society were to decide to subsidize a poorer litigant’s
discovery in particular suits, it hardly makes sense to impose that cost
128. See discussion supra Section III.B; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346–
49 (1976) (adopting a test that balances systemic costs against the goal of accuracy in
determining procedural due process).
129. See discussion supra Subsections III.C.2–3.
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on his opponent, rather than on society as a whole. Indeed, to allow a
private individual’s unilateral filing of a lawsuit to justify imposition of
discovery costs on the defendant gives rise to serious constitutional
concerns of due process. The Supreme Court has long held that due
process prohibits the deprivation of a defendant’s property absent
meaningful judicial involvement in the determination of that
defendant’s culpability.130
A conceivable objection to the reversal of the current cost allocation
model might be that such a practice would simply shift the externality,
for under the new model the responding party will have no incentive to
keep costs down. But it is the discovering party who sets the contours of
the response by the scope of its inquiries or production requests. In an
important sense, then, the outer limits of the costs that the responding
party will incur are set out by the requesting party. In any event, there
always exists the possibility of judicial intervention to determine that
the submitted costs are excessive. While one might respond that such
intervention would significantly increase the systemic burdens of the
discovery process, it is highly unlikely that judicial intervention would
be required in many instances. If the responding party knows that any
excessive costs it incurs may well not be reimbursed, it is unlikely to
risk incurring them in the first place.
IV. PLEADING, DISCOVERY, AND THE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL RULES
It should be clear by this point that an exclusive focus on the
concern that plaintiffs be able to vindicate their substantive rights in
court myopically ignores many of the most important elements of the
foundational litigation matrix. While the danger of under-enforcement
should surely be avoided wherever feasible, the fundamental values of
efficiency, fundamental fairness, and maintenance of the substantive–
procedural balance dictate the need to avoid both wasteful systemic
costs and the substantive economic skewing that inevitably results from
over-deterrence. Simply put, an understanding of the foundational
normative precepts of modern procedural theory demand that pleading
requirements impose some meaningful restraint on litigants’ ability to
invoke the elaborate discovery devices. Otherwise, it will be nearly
impossible to prevent parties who have suffered no legally cognizable
injury from wastefully increasing both the internal costs of the
adjudicatory system and the external costs of products and services in
the marketplace. Moreover, once a litigant is permitted to get past the
pleading stage to the discovery process, it is essential that the costs of
that system are attributed in a manner consistent with the dictates of
fundamental fairness and economic efficiency, in order to avoid the
130. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972).
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wasteful and inefficient misuse of that system.
Once all agree on these fundamental normative contours of the
procedural system, the question naturally arises whether those goals
may be achieved within the existing framework established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or whether instead fundamental
changes in that framework are necessary. Quite clearly, if the reversal in
cost allocation presumption were to be imposed, an amendment adding
this directive would need to be adopted. Of course, nothing in the
current version of the Federal Rules expressly prohibits a court from
shifting the costs of discovery from responding party to requesting
party, and it is well-accepted that a court possesses discretion to shift
costs under the broad powers given it by Rule 26(c).131 But absent a
provision in the Federal Rules expressly dictating that presumptively the
costs of discovery are to be imposed on the requesting party, it appears
clear that as a general matter courts will fail to allocate discovery costs
in this manner. Thus, it is vitally important that the Federal Rules be
amended to reflect such a change in traditional practice.
In contrast, the language of Rule 8(a) is in no way necessarily
inconsistent with a plausibility standard. The Court in both Twombly
and Iqbal has already construed Rule 8(a) to implement this standard,132
and the Rule’s wording is sufficiently flexible to countenance such an
interpretation purely as a matter of textual construction.133 Although the
drafters of the original Federal Rules (in most cases)134 sought to break
away from the unduly high barriers to suit set by the code pleading
standard for required factual detail, it is difficult to imagine that they
intended to allow the pleading of vague and conclusory assertions of
legal wrongdoing to enable a plaintiff to invoke the costly and
burdensome discovery process absent some showing that the case was
more than fanciful. Otherwise, defendants would regularly be at the
mercy of any plaintiff who chose to sue them. The mere filing of a
complaint alleging a legal wrong would force the defendant to suffer the
costs and burdens of discovery. Absent overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, one should not assume the Rules’ drafters would have

131. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). It is interesting to note that the current version of the Federal
Rules expressly provides for such cost shifting in the case of expert witnesses. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(4)(E). Furthermore, the Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2) made clear that the conditions
the Court may impose on ordering discovery include payment by the requesting party of all or
part of the reasonable costs of obtaining the information. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee
Note, at 17, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/EDiscovery_
w_Notes.pdf.
132. See discussion supra Section II.C.
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
134. In Rule 9(b), the drafters established an island of fact pleading when the issues of
fraud or mistake were to be pled. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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intended such an untenable result.135 Thus, even absent an explicit
amendment to Rule 8(a), courts applying that provision may and should
reasonably construe it in accordance with the dictates of the plausibility
standard.
The fact remains that in its present form Rule 8(a) is sufficiently
ambiguous so as to render it subject to constructions different from the
plausibility standard. In order to remove any conceivable ambiguity,
therefore, the Advisory Committee should revise the provision’s
language in a manner that explicitly invokes plausibility as the standard
that must be satisfied before a party may proceed to the discovery
process. Were the Advisory Committee to track the language of the
standard articulated in Twombly, the revision of Rule 8(a) would send a
very clear message to all concerned that while in most cases a complaint
need not satisfy the high bar imposed by a fact pleading standard, 136 the
mere assertion of a vague and conclusory claim will not permit a litigant
to proceed past the pleading stage. Something more is required in a
complaint: the allegation of nonconclusory facts sufficient to give rise
to the reasonable suspicion that a violation of the plaintiff’s rights has
occurred. Thus, while perhaps as a doctrinal matter formal adoption of
such an amendment may not be essential to restoring the proper balance
to the pleading standard, doing so would avoid any further confusion
among the courts as to what the controlling standard is. More
importantly, adoption of such an amendment would stand as a social
and political reaffirmation of the need for an economically balanced
approach to the competing interests involved in the pleading context.
While formal amendment of the pleading rule may not be essential,
the same is not true of the discovery process. As explained earlier, the
key to taming the discovery process is to understand that, in the first
instance, the costs of discovery are appropriately seen as costs
attributable to the requesting party, rather than the responding party.
While in its current form Rule 26(c),137 which authorizes the issuance of
protective orders, vests broad discretion in the district court’s hands to
“shift” costs, such a power is only rarely employed. In any event, the
point of the amendment would not be merely to authorize the court to
shift costs, but rather expressly to attribute the costs, in the first
instance, to the requesting party. Therefore, Rule 26 should be amended
to state unambiguously that discovery costs are attributable to the
requesting party, unless applicable substantive law provides to the

135. See discussion supra Section II.A.
136. It should once again be emphasized that, for whatever reason, the drafters of the
original Federal Rules chose in Rule 9(b) to impose a fact pleading standard in cases of fraud or
mistake, and there appears to be no movement to alter that exception. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
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contrary or the court finds that a compelling reason for shifting the costs
to the responding party exists.138
CONCLUSION: ASSURING THAT THE GENIUS OF 1938 SURVIVES IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (WITH A LITTLE TWEAK EVERY NOW AND THEN)
There is much to celebrate as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
rapidly approach their seventy-fifth birthday. The genius of Charles
Clark was his effort to walk the tightrope of the substantive–procedural
balance. The goal of Judge Clark and his colleagues was to assure that
the rules of procedure neither over-enforce nor under-enforce the
applicable substantive law. Judge Clark and his colleagues wisely saw
that the barriers to suit imposed by the stringent standards of fact
pleading failed that test, and therefore needed substantial revision. But
to construe their abandonment of the fact pleading standard as an
intended shift to no standard at all would be to commit the same sin of
all-or-nothing clumsiness that had plagued the standard they sought to
replace. First-year law students have long been taught that law is not
simple; there are invariably conceptual and practical complexities that
must be carefully balanced. Though it is perhaps difficult for us now to
see it, the genius of the drafters of the original Federal Rules was their
ability to recognize those complexities and to carefully seek to balance
the competing needs as a means of achieving a solution that takes all of
those complexities into account. Today, there are many who—in the
name of the Rules’ original drafters—urge that we impose an extremely
lax pleading standard that allows plaintiffs to trigger the burden and
costs of the discovery process by nothing more than a cryptic and
conclusory assertion of a legal wrong. But now to characterize what the
drafters did as the equivalent of a bull in a china shop, destroying
everything in its path, would be an injustice. The goal today should be
to implement their genius under modern conditions. The Court in
Twombly and Iqbal basically did just that, though one could justifiably
question the extent to which it adequately explained its conclusion and
rationale. Today’s goal should therefore not be to sweep away the
important insights of those pleading decisions, but rather to use them as
138. Beyond this amendment, it would also make sense for the Advisory Committee to
consider possible alternative methods of directly controlling discovery. One such method that
has been suggested is restriction of the scope of available discovery. For example, respected
organizations have suggested: “Discovery in general and document discovery in particular
should be limited to documents or information that would enable a party to prove or disprove a
claim or defense or enable a party to impeach a witness.” AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 8 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM
/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053. That question,
however, is an issue on which this Article takes no position.
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a basis for a deeper intellectual exploration of the moral, social, and
economic foundations of modern procedure.
The drafters of the Rules were only human, and humans make
mistakes—especially in the process of revolutionizing an entire system.
In the discovery process, the drafters’ first mistake was their failure to
consider the question of to whom discovery costs were to be
appropriately attributed. The drafters’ second mistake was their flawed
implicit assumption that the costs were properly to be attributed not to
the party who is best able to economically internalize the costs and
benefits of discovery, but to the party who has little or no control over
those decisions. Just as some of the drafters’ failures in the discovery
process have already been corrected over the years, it is now time to
correct these errors—and then wish the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure a happy birthday.
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